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Scherzer et al. (2012) offer an important
step forward in the literature by explor-
ing the relationship between a range of
different measures of Theory of Mind
(ToM) with a small sample of patients
with schizophrenia experiencing signif-
icant symptomatology. Consistent with
earlier work (Brüne, 2005; Bell et al.,
2010), they note that impairments in the
ability to make sense of the mental states
of others involves multiple components
that cannot be reduced to one another. To
study this they adopt a wide battery of five
tasks ranging from identifying: emotions
in photographs of eyes, characters inten-
tions within stories, faux-pas, and inten-
tions on the basis of simple hints. They
also use what they define as a real-world
task, which is attributing mental states to
characters be seen in short movies who
are undergoing complex interactions. All
the tasks discriminated well between clin-
ical and community participants and were
relatively closely related to one another
with the expectation of the eyes recog-
nition test. The authors conclude that
results support the possibility that ToM
involves two dimensions: “first and sec-
ond order inferences or beliefs, interpreta-
tion of intentions, interpretation of affect
and on the basis of the social cognitive
ToM content: faux pas, interpreting indi-
rect messages, lies, irony etc., and contexts”
(p. 9). They point to the importance of
future research which considers the role
of content and context of social cogni-
tion.
When trying to make sense of these
findings within emerging models of dys-
function, we were struck with five issues
which remain to be addressed by future
work. The first concerns the nature
and onset the social cognitive deficits.
Presumably these are deficits which could
emerge in different ways and at differ-
ent times in response to different causal
factors. The loss of neurocognitive abil-
ity, stigma and the collapse of connections
with others, preexisting trauma (Lysaker
et al., 2011a) and poverty of early attach-
ment have all been suggested separately to
contribute to difficulties recognizing and
reasoning about mental states but little
work has considered whether social cog-
nitive profiles in schizophrenia can be dis-
sociated on the basis of the causes of and
timing of when deficits emerged and not
just the manifest nature of those deficits.
A second issue concerns the possibil-
ity that social cognitive acts also differ
from one another in terms of the degree
to which they involve making a discrete
judgment about phenomenon which are
correctly or incorrectly identified (e.g.,
judging a facial expression) vs. synthesiz-
ing information into a larger representa-
tion where complexity and coherence are
more important than just being right or
wrong (e.g., constructing a personal nar-
rative). As we have suggested elsewhere
(Lysaker et al., 2013), correctly judging
discrete phenomena such as one’s perfor-
mance on a task or the likely intention of
someone in a story are certainly relevant,
however these acts differ conceptually
from metacognitive acts in which persons
synthesize a range of information into a
complex meta-representation which can-
not be said to be right or wrong but which
could be to varying degrees rich and flex-
ible and person-specific (Ciaramelli et al.,
2013). Discrete and synthetic acts should
inform one another and both are neces-
sary for responding effectively to evolving
social exchanges. However, different prob-
lems would be expected to emerge if one
but not the other were more impaired. For
instance, to sustain a truly intimate rela-
tionship over time it is important to get a
decent idea of the specific emotion another
is feeling in the moment while also updat-
ing a large picture of that person’s core
identity.
A third concern is that test batter-
ies such as those adopted by Scherzer
et al. neglect the reality that understanding
mental states is of uttermost importance
when thinking about personally relevant
matters. If one has been abused for
example, when encountering another per-
son the main issue is not just identifying
a hint about what to buy at a store but
deciding whether the other person should
be perceived as a potential perpetrator
(Lysaker et al., 2011a) or a source of dan-
ger (Salvatore et al., 2012). In this example
there may be specific mentalizing difficul-
ties when intense affect has been reacti-
vated by memories of abuse which then
create a bias for the interpretation of evil
intentions, again something that cannot be
measured with the traditional ToM tasks.
A fourth issue concerns the examina-
tion by Scherzer et al. of participants exclu-
sively with moderately severe symptoms.
Symptom remission appears to be more
the rule than the exception (Silverstein
and Bellack, 2008) and hence it is unclear
whether the participants here were more
treatment resistant, not offered state of
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the art psychosocial treatment or just in
a particularly distressed period of their
lives. Symptom remission represents only
one domain of recovery and has been
suggested by multiple studies to be rela-
tively uncorrelated with more subjective
domains of recovery including quality of
life. Thus to truly understand the extent to
which different social cognitive processes
can be dissociated persons in a non-acute
phases of illness should be considered.
A final issue we would raise concerns
the need to study social cognition within
treatment. In psychotherapy persons nat-
urally discuss their goals and challenges
and are in a position to examine the attri-
butions they make about the mental pro-
cesses of others (Lysaker et al., 2011b,
2013, in press). We contend that dis-
course analysis of such interactions will
offer unique opportunities to see how per-
sons not only perceive others but then also
how they reason about those perceptions.
These studies could well assist in the devel-
opment of such interventions while also
deepening our awareness of how mentalis-
tic deficits challenge recovery in real time.
In summary we have suggested that for
the literature to move forward and bet-
ter understand deficits in social cognition
in schizophrenia, work is needed which
consider: the causal factors and emergence
of social cognitive deficits, the extent to
which discrete vs. synthetic ideas about
oneself and others are at issue, the impact
of affective states, the phase of illness in
which these deficits occur and how these
deficits are manifest during and respond to
treatment.
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